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I. INTRODUCTIONVENEZUELA has been dependent on foreign investments since
its beginning. The connection between the country and foreign
investments has been related to its geographic location and natu-
ral resources. Over time, the legal guarantees granted to foreign inves-
tors have changed depending on the historical and political momentum.
This descriptive article addresses the past and present protections and
legal guarantees granted by Venezuela to foreign investments. It is di-
vided into five parts. Part I deals with the historical background; Part II
deals with the general legal framework; Part III deals with the investment
treaty protection; Part IV is about significant investment awards on Vene-
zuela; Part V is about double taxation treaties entered into by Venezuela.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
On March 27, 1528, King Charles V of Spain granted a lease on the
territory of the province of Venezuela to German merchants, the Welser
family, to exploit its natural resources (specifically, to find gold and sil-
ver) under very preferential terms, including tax exemptions and the mo-
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nopoly of import and export trade of the province.' The Welsers
explored and exploited the territory of Venezuela for eighteen years dur-
ing which time they were also entitled to appoint the governor.2 In fact,
the first governor of Venezuela was Ambrosius Ehinger (also known as
Dalfinger and as Alfinger), a German who led the first Welser expedition
into the land granted to them by King Charles V.3 The contract between
the Welser family and the King of Spain, who was also the Holy Roman
Emperor, was retribution for the economic benefits the Welser family
had provided the Roman Empire during many years, primarily to finance
the appointment of King Charles as Holy Roman Emperor. "Disputes
with the Spanish Government soon arose and banished any hopes for rich
profit from the undertaking. In 1541, the Spanish Government desired to
bring suit, against the governors of the colony."4 The province of Vene-
zuela was subsequently taken from the Welsers by legal decision in 1556
and went to the Spanish Crown.5 In 1557, the Welsers resigned their
rights in the dispute.6
Over time, Venezuela has continued to be a place of significant historic
events related to international investment law. For example, during the
independence war, Jacob Idler supplied weapons to warriors.7 Upon
Venezuela winning its independence from Spain, Idler sought payment,
but found it difficult to obtain satisfaction. Venezuela had merged and
demerged into the Gran Colombia during the time of the claim. Eventu-
ally, mixed commissions were set up between the United States and Ven-
ezuela to settle the dispute.8 The case, known as Jacob Idler v.
Venezuela, is, so far, "the only arbitral proceeding to which the United
States has been a party in which the tribunal has been impeached for
fraud." 9
Similarly, in 1902, Venezuela suffered a naval blockage by Britain, Ger-
many, and Italy over the Venezuelan government's refusal to pay foreign
debts and damages suffered by European citizens in a recent Venezuelan
civil war.10 The outrage over the incident brought about statements from
other governments, including Argentina through its foreign minister Luis
Marfa Drago, whereby "it set forth the policy that no foreign power, in-
cluding the United States, could use force against an American nation to
1. M. M. Lacas, A Sixteenth-Century German Colonizing Venture in Venezuela, 9 TIH
AMERICAS 275 (1953).
2. BERNARD MOSES, TIHE SPANISi DEPENDENCIES IN Sourn AMERICA: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF TIEIR CIVILIZATION 75 (Harper & Brothers, 1914).
3. Id. at 60.
4. Klemens L?ffler, Bartholomeus Welser, THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://
www.newadvent.org/cathen/15582a.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Jane Lucas de Grummond, The Jacob Idler Claim Against Venezuela 1817-1890,34
HISP. AM. HisY. REv. 131 (1954).
8. Id. at 134.
9. Id. at 131.
10. Venezuela Crisis of 1902, GLOBALSECURITY.ORo, http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/ops/venezuelal902.htm (last modified May 7, 2011, 2:36:15 AM).
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collect debt," giving birth to the Drago Doctrine.'
With the discovery of significant amounts of usable oil reserves in the
early twentieth century, Venezuela became a magnet for foreign invest-
ments. In the subsequent years, as in many other Latin American coun-
tries, Venezuela praised sovereignty over investment protection, and as a
result, it adopted the Calvo Doctrine, according to which foreign inves-
tors were not entitled to sue the host state in international fora, but were
rather subject to litigate inbound.12 Venezuela also prevalently followed
economic policies contrary to foreign investments through the dependen-
tistas recipes of import substitution during the seventies and its legal tools
such as decision twenty four of the Cartagena Accord, which required
foreign investments to be authorized a priori,'3 and through strong de-
fense of international instruments intended to guarantee the economic
sovereignty of states such as the United Nations Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States.14
Passing through an era of antagonism, Venezuela, like the rest of Latin
America, shifted towards policies friendlier to foreign investments. As
most neighbor countries started to become part of the emerging interna-
tional law of foreign investments, so did Venezuela. Jamaica, for exam-
ple, became part of the ICSID Convention in 1966, while Paraguay did
the same in 1983.1s Most of the other Latin American countries became
signatories in the nineties.16 Likewise, in 1969 Ecuador became the first
Latin American country to ever sign and ratify a bilateral investment
treaty (BIT); Switzerland was the other state party.' 7 In 1974, Paraguay
was the second Latin American country to enter into a BIT, with South
Africa as the other state party.18 Venezuela signed its first BIT in 1991
with the Kingdom of the Netherlands."
11. Drago Doctrine, E NoTims, http://www.enotes.com/topic/Drago-Doctrine (last vis-
ited Mar. 26, 2012).
12. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
13. ERNESLo TIRONI, Por FICAs FRENTE AL CAPI'TAL EXTuRANJERO EN LA INTEGRA-
CION ANDINA (Estudios CIEPLAN Ser. No. 11, 1977).
14. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. Doc A/RES/3281 (1974); See Information on Ecua-
dor: Bilateral Investment Treaties, SisTEMA DE INFORMACION SoR COMERCIO
ExTERIOR [FOREIGN TRADE INFORMATION SYSTEM), http://www.sice.oas.org/cty-
index/ecu/ecuBits e.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2012); also Christine Cerna, Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 69 AM. Soc'Y INT'L I. PRoc. 225 (1975).
15. List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, INTI'I. CENTRE




17. Information on Ecuador: Bilateral Investment Treaties, SISTEMA I) INFORMACION
Sonan, ComaiIcio ExiiRioi [FOREIGN TRADE INFORMATION SYSTEM], http://
www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/ecu/ecuBits-e.asp (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
18. Information on Paraguay: Bilateral Investment Treaties, SISTEMA DE INFORMACION
SOBRE COMERCIO EXTERIOR [FOREIGN TRADE INFORMATION SYSTEM], http://
www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/PRY/PRYBits-e.asp, (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
19. Information on Venezuela: Bilateral Investment Treaties, SISTEMA DE INFORMA-
cION SOBRE COMERCIo ExrERIOR [FOREIGN TRADE INFORMATION SYSTEM],
http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/VEN/VENNatlDocs-e.asp (last visited Mar. 26,
2012).
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The climax of the shift of the Latin American countries with regards to
foreign investments can be found in the nineties when the majority of the
countries started to grant international protection to alien capital en
masse. During those years, most Latin American countries signed and
ratified the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes (ICSID) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee MIGA Con-
ventions. 20 Latin American countries entered into BITS with countries
that were primarily capital-exporting countries, but also with other capi-
tal-importing countries and with Latin American countries themselves.
Likewise, free trade agreements were entered into where provisions for
investment protection were included. Among the latter, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) deserves special reference.
Effective in 1994, NAFTA provided for detailed international protection
to investments of any of the three signatories countries (Canada, Mexico,
and the United States) in any of the other three signatory countries.21
While the surge of international investment protection mechanisms
were developed in Latin America, Brazil remained skeptical of commit-
ting itself to that sort of guarantee as evidenced by the fact it never signed
the ICSID Convention and has not ratified any of the BITs it has
signed.22 Brazil has also become the largest recipient of foreign invest-
ment in the western hemisphere.23
Since 2000, the investment arbitration cases have grown exponentially,
with Argentina taking the lead in the number of cases where it is the
defendant. Similarly, according to the recent statistics of ICSID, Latin
America is the region with the most cases where countries are defend-
ants, reaching more than forty percent of the caseload. 24 Likewise, today
there are almost 450 BITs signed by Latin American countries.25
Venezuela signed a majority of its BITs in the nineties, ostensibly with
many other Latin American countries.26 It has entered into additional
20. See List of Contracting States and Other Signatories of the Convention, supra note
15; see also MIGA Members, WoRn e BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:20
122866-menuPK:64020025-pagePK:64020054- piPK:64020408- theSitePK:2780
36-isCURL:Y,00.html (last updated July 18, 2009).
21. See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTA'rIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
22. Leany Lemos & Daniela Campello, The Non-Ratification of Bilateral Investment
Treaties: A Story of Conflict in a Land of Cooperation, PRINCETON U. 4, 12
(May 18, 2011), available at http://www7.uc.cl/icp/webcp/img/pdf/LEMOS
CAMPELLOFINAL.pdf.
23. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2010 at
page XX, available at http://www.unctad.org/en/Docs/wir20l0fas-en.pdf (last vis-
ited April 24, 2012).
24. See ICSID Caseload - Statistics 2011, INT'L CENTER FOR SEFrLEMENT OF INV. Dis-
Pums, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSIDIFrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDoc
RH&actionVal=CaseLoadStatistics (last visited Mar.26, 2011).
25. Investment and Political Risk in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Economies, Mu'ri-
LATERAL INv. GUARANTEE AGENCY 33 (2010), http://www.miga.org/documents/
WIPR10ebookchap2.pdf.
26. See Information on Venezuela: Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 19.
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BITs in the recent years, including BITs with Russia, Vietnam, and
Iran.2 7 Recently, Venezuela has denounced the ICSID Convention while
at the same time there have been expressions of developing different
types of dispute resolution mechanisms within one of the regional inte-
gration ventures. 28
III. SCOPE OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Under Article 299 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela (Constituci6n de la Reptiblica Bolivariana de Venezuela,
"CRBV"), it is stated that "[t]he state, jointly with private initiative, shall
promote the harmonic development of the national economy." 29
Article 301 also states that foreign investments shall be subject to the
same conditions to which the national investments are subject.30
B. STATE RESPONSIBILITY
1. Organization of the State
According to the CRBV, Venezuela is organized as a "Decentralized
Federal State" through a vertical distribution of the public authority in
three levels: Municipal, State, and National, to which exclusive and con-
current competencies are allocated.3' The National level is divided into
five branches: legislative, executive, judicial, electoral, and citizens.32
As per Article 137 of the CRBV, the organs of public power are bound
by legality; they can only do that which they are expressly authorized by
law to do.33 Article 140 establishes the principle of a State's patrimonial
responsibility when damages or injury are attributable to the State as a
consequence of either the provision of public services or the administra-
tive activity of the State. 34
27. Venezuela, LATIN ARrTRATION LAw, http://www.latinarbitrationlaw.com/vene-
zuela/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2012).
28. Silvia Karina Fiezzoni, UNASUR Arbitration Centre: The Present Situation and the
Principal Characteristics of Ecuador's Proposal, INVESTMENTE-1-REATYNWS, Jan. 12,
2012.
29. Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, as amended, Gaceta Oficial
No. 5.908 Extraordinario, 19 de Febrero de 2009 (Venez), available at http://
www.tsj.gov.ve/gacetaext/febrero/190209/190209-5908-1.html [hereinafter
CBRV].
30. Id. art. 301.
31. Id. arts. 4, 136, 164, 178 (establishing the competencies of the Municipal, State and
National public authorities, respectively).
32. Basic Facts on Venezuela, VENEZUELAANALysis.com, http://venezuelanalysis.com/
basicfacts (last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
33. CBRV, supra note 29, art. 137.
34. Id. art. 140.
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2. State-Owned/Controlled Enterprises
The State may also act under ius gestionis as an independent actor in
the national economy. Article 300 of the Constitution establishes that the
national law shall provide the conditions for the creation of functionally
decentralized entities to undertake social or entrepreneurial activities to
guarantee the "reasonable economic and social productivity of the public
resources."35 The state also has authority to use its commercial policy to
defend the economic activities of the national enterprises, whether public
or private. 36
Article 301 of the CRBV grants the State the authority to oversee oil
activity and other industries, exploitations, services, and goods of public
interest and of strategic character.37 Such authority is granted through an
organic law and rooted in the national interest.
As per that authority, the State is empowered to create enterprises in
reserved sectors as well as in the areas of its interest, with full legal per-
sonality for their conduct and independently liable vis-A-vis third parties.
In the case of hydrocarbons, the entity created is Petr6leos de Venezuela
SA ("PDVSA"), which is entirely managed by the State.38
In addition to PDVSA, another state-controlled enterprise is the
Corporaci6n Venezolana de Guayana (CVG), a regional autonomous
corporation charged with exploitation of mineral resources in the
Guayana region either directly or through its state-owned affiliates. 39
Under the 1999 Mining Law, all mineral deposits are property of the state
and may be exploited by the state itself or by individuals or companies
with concessions or special authorizations granted by the state.40
Likewise, in 2009 the state reserved by law all assets and services con-
nected to the development of the primary activities described in the Or-
ganic Hydrocarbons Law. 41 Accordingly, those activities can only be
undertaken by the state, PDVSA, or the designated affiliate or joint ven-
ture companies, provided that the joint venture is controlled by PDVSA
or its affiliates.42 A similar rule applies in the petrochemical industry. 43
35. Id. art. 300.
36. Id. art. 301.
37. Id.
38. Id. art. 303.
39. CVG with Autonomy to Drive the Development of the Guayana Region, REPUB-
uCA BoiVARIANA DE VFNEZUELA, http://www.cvg.gob.ve/ingles/desarrollo.htmi
(last visited Apr. 4, 2012).
40. Ley De Minas [Mining Law], arts. 2, 7, Gaceta Oficial No. 5.382, 28 de Septiembre
de 1999 (Venez.), available at http://web.laoriental.com/Leyes/L032N/LO32nT2
Capl.htm.
41. Ley Orginica que Reserva al Estado Bienes y Servicios Conexos a las Actividades
Primarias de Hidrocarburos [Organic Law that Reserves for the State Assets and
Services connected to Primary Activities of Hydrocarbons], art. 2, Gaceta Oficial
No. 39.173, 7 de mayo de 2009 (Venez.), available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gacetal
mayo/070509/070509-39173-1.html.
42. Id. art. 1.
43. La Ley Orginica para el Desarrollo de las Actividades Petroqufmicas, [Organic
Law for the Development of the Petrochemical Activities], art. 5, Gaceta Oficial
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3. Domestic Law Limits on International Arbitration with the State
Venezuelan state-owned enterprises are not expressly prohibited from
consenting to international arbitration, but when contracts granting such
consent are deemed to be of national public interest, the National Assem-
bly must approve them. According to the CRBV, in public interest con-
tracts, unless unsuitable due to the nature of the contracts, "a clause shall
be deemed included even if not expressed whereby doubts or disputes
which may arise concerning such contracts" which cannot be settled ami-
cably by the parties shall be decided by the local courts in accordance
with domestic law.4 4 Article 151 of the CRBV makes explicit that in
those cases, there will be no grounds for any foreign claim. 4 5 The sectors
most affected by the limitations of Article 151 are those related to natural
resources or those considered by the State to be of strategic character,
including hydrocarbon, petrochemical, iron ore, and cement, among
others.46
C. DOMESTIC LAW INVESTMENT PROTECTION FRAMEWORK
1. Foreign Investment Law
On October 3, 1999, under legislative authorization, the President
passed a decree with the authority of the Law on Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments ("LPPI"). 4 7 The LPPI applies to both national and
foreign investments. Its purpose is to develop a stable and predictable
legal framework under which the investments can take place "in a climate
of security through the regulation of the actions of the State vis-A-vis
those investors and investments in order to obtain the increase, diversifi-
cation, and harmonic complement of investments in favor of national de-
velopment objectives." 4 8 No specific sectors are excluded from the scope
of the law, but the State could legally reserve certain activities for local
investors or for its own development. The law applies to new and old
investments alike, but it does not apply to disputes in existence before the
law entered into force.4 9
The law contains a broad definition of investment. Standards of na-
tional treatment and fair and equitable treatment are included, as well as
prohibitions of discriminatory and arbitrary treatment.50 Confiscations
are prohibited, except for exceptional cases per the terms of the Constitu-
No. 39.203, 18 de junio de 2009 (Venez.), available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/gaceta
junio/1 80609/180609-39203-1.html.
44. CBRV, supra note 29, art. 151.
45. Id.
46. Emily A. Witten, Arbitration of Venezuelan Oil Contracts: A Losing Strategy?, 4
TFx J. On- GAS & ENERY L. 59, 74 (2008-2009).
47. Decreto con Rango y Fuerza de ley de Promocion y Proteccion de Inversiones
[Decree with Rank and Force of Law on Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments], Gaceta Oficial Extraordinario No. 5.390, 22 de Octubre de 1999 (Venez.),
available at http://docs.venezuela.justia.com/federales/decretos/decreto-n-356.pdf.
48. Id. art. 1.
49. Id. art. 2.
50. Id. art. 6.
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tion.5' Expropriations or measures tantamount to expropriation must be
for reasons of public use or social interest, according to the process estab-
lished for those purposes, on a non-discriminatory basis and following
prompt, just, and adequate compensation. 52
Disputes related to the investment law can be submitted to local courts
or local arbitration after exhausting local administrative remedies.53
If the investor opts for the local court, then such competent court will
be determined based on the amount of the dispute in controversy. If that
amount is less than 10,000 Tax Units (TU),54 then the competent court
will be the Superior Court on the Contentious Administrative.55 If the
amount in controversy exceeds 10,001 TU up to 70,000 TU, then jurisdic-
tion will fall to the Contentious Administrative Courts.56 If the amount
exceeds 70,000 TU, then the Political and Administrative Chamber of the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice will have jurisdiction,57 but if the investor
selects local arbitration, the Commercial Arbitration Law shall govern.
With respect to international arbitration, the law establishes that dis-
putes between a foreign investor with whom Venezuela has a BIT can be
submitted to international arbitration if that BIT so establishes, without
prejudice to the possibility of the investor's use of local remedies.58
The provision regarding consent to international arbitration has been
controversial. Article 22 of the Law on Promotion and Protection of In-
vestments provides that the relevant disputes "shall be subject to interna-
tional arbitration as per the terms of the respective treaty or agreement, if
it so establishes."5 9 Many have interpreted the term "shall" as an expres-
sion of the State's consent. The article also contains the condition "if it so
establishes" and establishes that the dispute shall be subject to interna-
tional arbitration "as per the terms of the respective treaty or agree-
ment." 60 In some cases, BITs do not contain provisions for international
arbitration. Therefore, it would seem contradictory to assume that Arti-
cle 22 alone constitutes consent to arbitrate all disputes between Vene-
zuela and foreign investors from all countries.61 The Venezuelan
51. Id. art. 11.
52. Id.
53. Id. art. 23.
54. Expatriate Tax Ebook - Venezuela, GRANT THORNTON http://www.gti.org/Ser-
vices/Tax-services/Expatriate-tax/Expatriate-tax-ebook/Venezuela/facts-and-
figures.asp (last updated July 6, 2011).
55. Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [Supreme Tribunal of Justice], Political and Adminis-
trative Chamber, Decision No. 01900 of Oct. 27, 2004 (Venez.)
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Decreto con Rango y Fuerza de ley de Promocion y Proteccion De Inversiones
[Decree with Rank and Force of Law on Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments], supra note 47, art. 22.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Omar E. Garcfa-Bolivar, El arbitraje en el marco de la Ley de Promoci6n y Protec-
ci6n de Inversiones: las posibles interpretaciones [Arbitration in the Framework of
the Law for the Promotion and Protection of Investments: Possible Interpreta-
tions], REVISTA DEL TRIBUNAL SUPREMO DE JUSTICIA, No. 26. (2008).
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Supreme Court interpreted the LPPI and concluded that Article 22 does
not contain a universal expression of consent for all foreign investors to
be able to submit arbitral claims against Venezuela. 62
The arbitral tribunal in Mobil Corporation v. The Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela, issued an award in June 2010 concluding that Article 22 of
the Law on Promotion and Protection of Investments did not contain an
expression of arbitral consent by Venezuela. 63 The tribunal examined the
arguments presented by the parties and analyzed the State's intention to
interpret the article. It also observed:
[A]t the time of the adoption of the Investment Law, Venezuela had
already signed more than 15 BITs stating either that it gave "its un-
conditional consent to the submission of disputes" to ICSID arbitra-
tion or that its disputes with foreign investors "shall at the request of
the nationals concerned be submitted to ICSID," or using both
phrases. Comparable words were used in some national laws and in
the ICSID model clauses. If it had been the intention of Venezuela
to give its advance consent to ICSID arbitration in general, it would
have been easy for the drafters of Article 22 to express that intention
clearly by using any of those well-known formulas. 64
Similarly, on December 30, 2010, the tribunal in Cemex Caracas Invest-
ments B. V. And Cemex Caracas II Investments B. V. v. Venezuela issued a
decision on jurisdiction in which, inter alia, it held that Article 22 of the
Law on Promotion and Protection of Investments does not constitute
consent to jurisdiction by Venezuela. 65 In the words of that tribunal:
The Tribunal thus arrives at the conclusion that such an intention has
not been established. As a consequence, it cannot conclude from the
obscure and ambiguous text of Article 22 that Venezuela, in adopt-
ing the 1999 Investment Law, consented unilaterally to ICSID arbi-
tration for all disputes covered by the ICSID Convention in a
general manner. That article does not provide a basis for jurisdiction
of the Tribunal in the present case. 66
62. Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [Supreme Tribunal of Justice], Constitutional Cham-
ber, Oct. 17, 2008, Decision No. 1541 (Venez.), available at http://www.tsj.gov.ve/
decisiones/scon/octubre/1541-171008-08-0763.htm (ruling on a petition to interpret
a constitutional provision that arbitration was, in fact, constitutional and that the
arbitral awards were final and noting that for arbitration to be viable, the parties
had to consent in writing, unequivocally and explicitly).
63. Mobil Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB 07/27,
Decision on Jurisdiction, $ 123 (June 10, 2010), available at http://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID[FrontServletrequestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowDoc&docld=D
C1510_En&caseld=C25.
64. Id. 9 139.
65. Cemex Caracas Inv. v. Boliviarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/08/
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On August 2, 2011, the tribunal in Brandes Investment Partners, LP v.
Venezuela addressed for the third time the issue of consent under Article
22 of the Law on Promotion and Protection of Investments; it stated:
Despite the similarities between the content of the LPPI and that of
a BIT, the Tribunal does not find in the article that it has analyzed
nor in any other article of the LPPI, any provision that would allow it
to assert that it provides for Venezuela's consent to ICSID jurisdic-
tion.67 It is also an unquestionable fact that the basis for arbitration
is consent. There cannot be an arbitration, national or international,
ad hoc or institutional, before ICSID or any other entity that ad-
ministers arbitration proceedings, if the parties do not agree to
arbitrate.68
The tribunal additionally stated the following:
The statement made in the previous paragraph is definitive. Even in
the case of a dispute between private citizens, the rule is that they
must settle their disputes in court. The exception is that, only if they
agree, they may resolve their dispute through arbitration. If this is
true in the ambit of private law, it is even more so when a State is
involved, because when a State submits to arbitration proceedings, it
is waiving the possibility of resorting to its own courts.69
Based on the findings in the paragraphs above, in the Tribunal's
opinion, it is obvious that Article 22 of the Law on Promotion and
Protection of Investments does not contain the consent of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to ICSID jurisdiction. Therefore,
this Tribunal lacks competence to resolve the dispute that has been
submitted to it.70
2. Stabilization Regime
Under Article 17 of the Law on Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments (LPPI), the Republic has the authority to enter into contracts of
juridical stability to guarantee that certain economic conditions remain in
place during a given period of time.71 The stability can be extended to
taxes, export promotion, or incentives. For tax stability contracts, a
favorable opinion of the tax authority is required, and the contracts take
effect only after being authorized by the legislative branch.72
The LPPI provides for certain limitations on stability contracts. Ac-
cordingly, these cannot exceed a time period of ten years and can be ter-
67. Brandes Inv. Partners, LP v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB
08/03, Decision on Jurisdiction, 9 91 (Aug. 2, 2011), available at http://italaw.com/
documents/BrandesAward.PDF.
68. Id. 1110.
69. Id. 1 111.
70. Id. 118.
71. See Decreto 356, Promoci6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones [Law of the Promotion
and Protection of Investments], art. 17, Octubre 3, 1999, Gaceta Oficial No. 5.390,
22 de Octubre de 1999 (Venez.), available at http://www.idlo.int/MF/Documents/
Regulations/VENEZUELA6.pdf.
72. See id.
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minated if the investors breach their obligations under the contract. 3 In
the case of investor breach, Article 18 also provides that the investor
must compensate the Government for the benefits the investor received
under the stability contract. 74 The LPPI provides that disputes regarding
stability contracts may be submitted to institutional arbitration as per the
terms of the Law on Commercial Arbitration.75
The Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice (Tribunal) analyzed the
constitutionality of Article 17 of the Law on Promotion and Protection of
Investments. 76 It concluded that the article did not violate the constitu-
tional principle of non-discrimination because it applied to both national
and foreign investments.77 The Tribunal also found no violation of the
so-called principle of "tributary legality"-i.e., that the creation, modifi-
cation or elimination of taxes can only be effected through law-because
when the stability contracts concerned tax matters, they were to be ap-
proved by the tax administration and the National Congress.78 As of the
date of this writing, no stabilization contracts have been entered into by
Venezuela.
3. Foreign Investment Promotion Agency
CONAPRI, the National Council for Promotion of Investments, was
created in 1990 through the initiative of private and public sectors. As a
non-profit civil association of mixed nature (public and private), its mis-
sion is to provide timely information and technical assistance that might
contribute to attract and retain investments designed to strengthen the
productive and social development of Venezuela.79 CONAPRI is also a
facilitator between the public and private sectors to promote and enhance
the investment climate for the promotion and development of foreign
and national investment and to further the State's goal of achieving sus-
tainable development.80
Although CONAPRI provides information and technical assistance to
the public sector, the content of the information and advice has no bind-
ing character on the State.81 Similarly, CONAPRI does not have author-
ity to authorize the establishment or pre-establishment of an
investment. 82
73. See id. arts. 18(1), (3).
74. See id. art. 18(c).
75. Law on Promotion and Protection of Investments, Art. 18.
76. See Sentencia 16, No. Expediente 00-1483 [Judgment 1541, File 00-14831, Sala Con-
stitucional, Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [Constitutional Chamber, Supreme Tri-
bunal of Justice] (Feb. 14, 2001) (Venez.) available at http://www.tsj.gov.vel
decisiones/scon/Febrero/186-140201-00-1438%20.htm.
77. See id. at 21.
78. See id. at 15-17.
79. About CONAPRI, CONAPRI, http://www.conapri.org/English/articledetails.asp?
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4. International Arbitration Law
The Law on Commercial Arbitration 83 largely based on the UNCI-
TRAL model law, provides the framework for institutional and indepen-
dent arbitration as an alternative method of dispute resolution. 84 It does
not distinguish between national or international arbitration.85
Commercial arbitration is applicable, notwithstanding whether there
are any multilateral or bilateral agreements in place, to disputes that are
capable of settlement between persons with the capacity to negotiate.86
The following disputes are not subject to arbitration:
" Those contrary to the public order or criminal offenses, unless the
dispute is regarding the amount of personal liability if not estab-
lished by a final judgment;87
" Those regarding the authority or functions of the State acting as ius
imperium, or the authority or functions of persons or entities sub-
ject to public law;88
* Those regarding the capacity or marital status of persons, or about
the assets or rights of the handicapped without prior judicial
authorization;89
* Those for which there has been a final judgment, excluding those
about the patrimonial consequences of enforcing a judgment when
those consequences pertain exclusively to the parties in the pro-
ceeding and have not been determined by a final judgment. 90
According to Article 4 of the Law on Commercial Arbitration, not all
State-owned entities can be subject to arbitration, as some conditions
must be met.9 ' If one of the parties to the arbitration agreement is a
company whose ownership is at least fifty percent owned by the State, a
province, a municipality, or an autonomous institution, then the official
entity has priority and must approve of the agreement and the Minister in
charge must authorize it.92 In the absence of such condition, the arbitral
agreement is invalid.93
The arbitral agreement must express the type of arbitration and the
number of arbitrators, which cannot be less than three.94
Once the parties agree to arbitrate their potential disputes, it is as-
sumed that they have waived their right to settle disputes in ordinary
83. See Ley de Arbitraje Comercial [Law on Commercial Arbitration], art. 2, Gaceta
Oficial No. 36.430, 7 de Abril de 1998 (Venez.), available at http://www.sice.oas.
org/DISPUTE/COMARB/Venezuela/Larbcoms.asp.
84. CBRV, supra note 29, art. 258.
85. See Law on Commercial Arbitration, supra note 83, art. 3 (Venez.).
86. See id.
87. See id. art. 3(a).
88. See id. art. 3(b).
89. See id. arts. 3(c)-(d).
90. See id. art. 3(e).
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courts because arbitration excludes any other remedy. 95
D. INTERNATIONAL LAW INVESTMENT PROTECTION FRAMEWORK
1. ICSID Convention
Venezuela signed the ICSID Convention on August 8, 1993, ratified it
on May 2, 1995, and has made no notifications pursuant to Articles
25(1)(3)(4), 54(2), 68, 69 and 70 of the ICSID Convention. Venezuela
denounced the ICSID Convention on January 24, 2012.96 The denuncia-
tion will take effect on July 25, 2012.97
2. Investment Treaties
Venezuela has signed BITs with the following countries: Argentina,
Barbados, Belgium and Luxembourg, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Ger-
many, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Paraguay, Peru,
Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Uruguay
and Vietnam.
It has ratified the BITs with all of those countries except for Brazil, and
it denounced its BIT with the Netherlands.98 Additionally, the G3 trade
agreement entered into by Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico that in-
cluded a chapter on investment was effectively terminated in November
2006.99
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Awards
An ICSID award would be enforced as per the terms of Article 54 of
the ICSID Convention. 00
According to Article 54 (3) of the Convention, execution of the award
shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of judgments of
the State where execution is sought.' 0'
Under the Law on Commercial Arbitration, any arbitral award shall be
recognized by the courts as binding and final upon a written enforcement
95. See id. art. 5.
96. See http://www.pgr.gob.ve/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=531:
gobierno-bolivariano-denuncia-convenio-con-ciadi-&catid=2:noticias&Itemid=23.
97. See http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH &action
Val=Open Page&PageType=AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements
&pageName=Amnouncement00.
98. The BIT was denounced on March 21, 2008 and effectively terminated on Septem-
ber 14, 2008. Marianna P6rraga, Venezuela Denuncia Tratado De Inversiones Con
Holanda, Ei UNIVERSAL (May 1, 2008), http://www.eluniversal.com/2008/05/01I
eco-art venezuela-denuncia-t01A1549161.shtml.
99. See Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar, G3 Agreement: A Comparison of its Investment
Chapter with the Emerging International Law of Foreign Investment, 10 L. & Bus.
REV. AM. 779, 779 (2004).
100. See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, art. 54, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S.
159, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID].
101. See id. art. 54(3).
2012] 185
186 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 18
request.102 Accordingly, the procedure of exequatur established in the
Civil Procedure Code for foreign court judgments need not be fol-
lowed.103 But, the Tribunal has established that foreign judicial awards
shall not be enforced in the country if such awards are contrary to the
public constitutional order;104 the Tribunal has extended the same ratio-
nale to international arbitral awards. 05
The Tribunal expressly stated that in order to be enforceable, an ICSID
award should be undertaken in accordance with local law and that the
award would need to comply with local law.106
a. Local Law
The following laws are relevant for recognition and enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award:
* Law on Private International Law (1998): Article 62, "everything
related to international commercial arbitration" will be ruled by the
special rules on the subject.107
" Law on Promotion and Protection of Investment (1999): Article
23, the investor has the option of arbitration. 08
" Law on Commercial Arbitration (1998): Article 48, the arbitral
award of any country will be recognized as binding and final and
shall be enforced with no need of exequatur procedure.109 The
award will have the force of a judgment from a local court.
b. International Law
" Convention on the International Center for Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes (ICSID) (entry into force for Venezuela in 1995).110
* Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) Convention:
Disputes about a risk guarantee contract between a country and the
agency will be subject to arbitration where the award will be
102. See Law on Commercial Arbitration, supra note 83, art. 48.
103. See Codigo de Prodecimiento Civil [Cod. Proc. Civ.] arts. 850-858 (Venez.).
104. See Judgment 1541, File 08-0763, supra note 73; Sentencia 1942, No. Expediente
01-0415 [Judgment 1942, File 01-0415], Sala Constitucional, El Tribunal Supremo
de Justicia [Constituional Chamber, Supreme Tribunal of Justice] (July 15, 2003)
(Venez.), http://www.tsj.gov.ve/decisiones/scon/Julio/1 942-150703-01-0415.htm.
105. See id.; see also Sentencia 1265, No. Expediente 05-1853 [Judgment 1942, File 01-
0415], Sala Constitucional, El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia [Constitutional Cham-
ber, Supreme Tribunal of Justice] (Aug. 5, 2008) (Venez.) (ruling that a decision by
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights was unenforceable because it contra-
dicted Venezuelan public constitutional order), available at http://www.tsj.gov.vel
decisiones/scon/Agosto/l 265-050808-05-1853.htm.
106. See Judgment 1942, File 01-0415, supra note 104, at 18.
107. Ley de Derecho Internacional Privado, [Law of Private International Law], art. 62,
Gaceta Oficial No. 36.511, 6 de Agosto de 1998, (Venez.), available at http://
www.analitica.com/bitblio/congreso-venezuelalprivado.asp.
108. See Decreto 356, Ley de Promocio6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones [Law of Promo-
tion and Protection of Investments], art. 23, Gaceta Oficial No. 5.390, 22 de Oc-
tubre de 1999 (Venez.).
109. See Law on Commercial Arbitration, supra note 83, art. 48.
110. See generally ICSID, supra note 100.
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final.' I1
* Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbi-
tral Awards (New York Convention) (entry into force for Vene-
zuela in 1995): established the obligation of contracting States to
recognize an arbitral award if arbitration was agreed to
expressly. 112
" Inter-American Convention on the Extraterritorial Validity of For-
eign Judgments and Arbitral Awards (entry into force for Vene-
zuela in 1985): Article 2, for a judgment issued by a foreign court
to have extraterritorial efficacy the judgment shall meet the condi-
tions set forth therein.113
* Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitra-
tion (entry into force for Venezuela in 1985): Article 4, arbitral
awards not subject to appeal under the applicable law or procedural
rules shall have the force of a final judicial judgment. The award
could be enforced as if it were a judgment."14
IV. SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
TREATY PROTECTIONS
A. NATIONALITY OF THE INVESTOR
1. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
Most Venezuelan BITs provide that a foreign investor will be a natural
person with the nationality of the other contracting party to be deter-
mined based on the law of that country or a juridical person that has the
place of incorporation and/or its main office in that country. 1 5
In the case of juridical persons-whether for profit or non-profit-the
BITs where Venezuela is a party may provide protections based on con-
sideration of one or more of the following traditional criteria: (1) territo-
riality;116 (2) how nationality was derived, including the place of
incorporation, the origin of capital, and/or effective control of the invest-
111. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Convention Estab-
lishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Annex II, art. 4(i), Oct. 11,
1985 [hereinafter MIGA Convention].
112. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
art. 2(1), Jun. 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
113. See Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Extraterrito-
rial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, art. 2, May 14, 1979,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 51, 1439 U.N.T.S. 87 [hereinafter Foreign Judgments and Arbitral
Awards].
114. See Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 4,
opened for signature Jan. 30, 1975, OAS SER A20 (SEPEF), 14 I.L.M [hereinafter
Panama Convention].
115. See, e.g. Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno
de Barbados para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones [Agreement between
the Government of Barbados and the Government of the Republic of Venezuela
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments], Venez.-Barb., art. 1(c), July 15,




188 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 18
ment; 1'7 and (3) whether the investment was procured in accordance with
the laws of the relevant States." 8
Some BITs protect a foreign investment where foreign status is deter-
mined by the origination of capital. Such BITs extend the protection to
investments by nationals or companies (sociedades) of the other con-
tracting party.119 In these cases, a company of the other party is defined
by the company having its office in the territory of the other party.120
The definition of investor is largely uniform in Venezuela's BITs. The
nationality of juridical persons is defined by the place of incorporation or
by place of establishment. 12 1
But the BIT with Sweden provides that "a legal person having its seat
in a third country but effectively controlled directly or indirectly" by an
investor of the other contracting party will be considered a national of
that party.122
The BIT with Barbados extends protection to companies incorporated
as per the laws of the other contracting party, but provides that, for pur-
poses of disputes submitted to ICSID, the term companies (sociedades)
will also include a company owned or effectively controlled by nationals
of the other contracting party.123
The BIT with Spain provides that an investor is also a juridical person
incorporated in the host State, but effectively controlled by investors of
the other contracting party. 124
In contrast, the BIT with the United Kingdom defines a corporate for-
117. See Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repdblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de
Canadd para la Promoci6n y la Protecci6n de Inversiones [Agreement between the
Government of the Republic of Venezuela and the Government of Canada for the
Promotion and Protection of Investments], Can.-Venez., art. 1(g)(ii), July 1, 1996,
5.207 G.O. (Jan. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Can. BIT], available at http://www.conapri.
org/download/Vzla-Canada.pdf.
118. See id.
119. See Tratado entre la Rep6blica de Venezula y la Repdblica Federal de Alemania
para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones [Treaty between the Re-
public of Venezuela and the Federal Republic of Germany for the Promotion and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Ger.-Venez., art. 1(4), Apr. 22,1998, 36.383
G.O., (Jan. 28, 1998) [hereinafter Ger. BIT], available at http://www.conapri.org/
download/VzlaAlemania.pdf.
120. See, e.g., Can. BIT, supra note 112, art. 1(g)(ii).
121. See id.
122. Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repdiblica de Venezuela y la Confederaci6n
Suiza para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciprocas de Inversiones [Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Venezuela and the Government of the Kingdom of on the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], Swed.-Venez., art. 1(3),
4.801 G.O. (Nov. 1, 1994) [hereinafter Swed. BIT], available at http://www.conapri.
org/download/Vzla-Suiza.pdf.
123. See Barb. BIT, supra note 115, art. 1(d).
124. See Acuerdo entre la Reptiblica de Venezuela y el Reino de Espafia para la
Promoci6n y Protecci6n reciproca de Inversiones [Agreement between the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Venezuela and the Kingdom of Spain for the Promo-
tion and Protection of Investments], Venez.-Spain, art. 1(1)(b), Nov. 2, 1995,
36.281 G.O. (Sept. 1, 1997) [hereinafter Spain BIT], available at http://www.unctad.
org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/spain venezuelasp.pdf.
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eign investor only based on the criterion of establishment.12 5 Accord-
ingly, the term "companies" will mean a juridical person incorporated in
accordance with the laws of a contracting party.126 The BIT with Canada
similarly focuses on establishment and not on capital or effective control,
defining a corporate investor as an enterprise incorporated or constituted
in accordance with the home State's laws, which makes an investment in
the territory of the host State.127
2. National Law
The LPPI defines international investment as investment that is prop-
erty of or is effectively controlled by natural or juridical foreign per-
sons.12 8 Thus, the essential element is the nationality of the persons that
own or control the investment.
B. DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT
1. BITs
Investment is defined broadly in many Venezuela's BITs as any asset
(tangible or intangible) owned by an investor of the other contracting
State that is invested in the territory of the other contracting State, in-
cluding but not limited to: rights of property (moveable and immove-
able); intellectual property rights; any form of equity ownership in
corporations; rights derived from financial instruments; and the rights de-
rived from contractual relationships or from concessions.129
But the BIT with Canada provides that to be an investment, real estate
or other property (tangible or intangible) must be acquired with the ex-
pectation, or used for the purpose of, economic benefit or other business
purposes.130
Significantly, the BIT with Sweden provides that "[g]oods under a leas-
ing agreement placed at the disposal of an investor in the territory of one
Contracting Party by a lessor [that is] a national of the other Contracting
Party . . . shall be treated as an investment."' 3 '
Likewise, the BITs may provide that any change in the form of the
investment shall not affect its condition as an investment if the change
125. See Acuerdo entre el gobierno de la Reptiblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno del
Reino Unido de Gran Bretafia e Irlanda del Norte para la Promoci6n y la Protec-
ci6n de Inversiones [Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Ven-
ezuela and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland for the Promotion and Protection of Investments], Venez.-U.K., art. 1(d),
Mar. 15, 1995, 36.010 G.O., (July 30, 1996) [hereinafter U.K. BIT], available at
http://www.conapri.org/download/Vzla-GranBretana.pdf.
126. See id.
127. See Can. BIT, supra note 117, art. 1(g).
128. See Decreto 356, Ley de Promocio6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones [Law of the Pro-
tection and Promotion Investments], art. 3(2), Gaceta Oficial No. 5.390, 22 de Oc-
tubre de 1999 (Venez.).
129. See Barb. BIT, supra note 115, art. 1(a).
130. See Can. BIT, supra note 117, art. 1(f).
131. Swed. BIT, supra note 122, art. 1(2).
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does not contradict the law of the contracting State in which the invest-
ment is made.132
Claims on returns from trade transactions or credit in connection with
a trade transaction are expressly excluded from the definition of invest-
ment in the BIT with Vietnam.133
2. National Law
Under the Law on Promotion and Protection of Investments, invest-
ment is defined as:
Any asset to be used in producing income, under any of the corpo-
rate or contractual forms allow[ed] by Venezuelan law, including real
and personal property, whether tangible or intangible, over which
property rights or other rights in rem are held; negotiable instru-
ments; rights to benefits having an economic value; intellectual prop-
erty rights, including technical know-how, goodwill and customers;
and rights obtained pursuant to public law, including concessions for
exploration, extraction or exploration of natural resources and for
construction, exploration, conservation and maintenance of national
public works and to provide national public services, as well as any
other right granted by law or an administrative decision adopted pur-
suant to law.134
C. NATIONAL TREATMENT AND MOST-FAVORED-NATION TREATMENT
1. BITs
Venezuela has adopted international standards regarding national
treatment and most-favored-nation status for foreign investment.
National treatment guarantees that foreign investors of a country with
a BIT in force with Venezuela receive no less favorable treatment than
that received by national investors.135 Such treatment applies after the
establishment of investments made in accordance with national law.' 3 6
132. See Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repdblica Bolivariana de Venezuela y el
Gobierno de la Federaci6n de Rusia sobre la Promoci6n y Protecci6n Reciproca
de Inversiones [Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Vene-
zuela and the Government of the Russian Federation for the Promotion and Re-
ciprocal Protection of Investment], Russ.-Venez., art. 1, Sept. 27, 2009, 39.191 G.O.
(June 2, 2009) [hereinafter Russ. BIT], available at http://www.conapri.org/
download/Vzla-Rusia.pdf..
133. See Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Reptiblica Bolivariana de Venezuela y el
Gobierno de la Repdblica Socialista de Vietnam, para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n
de las Invesiones [Agreement between the Government of the Bolivarian Repub-
lic of Venezuela and the Socialist Government of Vietnam], Venez.-Viet., art. 1,
Nov. 20, 2008, 39.170 G.O. (May 4, 2009) [hereinafter Viet. BIT], available at http:/
/www.conapri.org/download/Vzla-Vietnam.pdf.
134. See Decreto 356, Ley de Promocio6n y Protecci6n de Inversiones [Law of the Pro-
tection and Promotion Investments], art. 3(1), Gaceta Oficial No. 5.390, 22 de Oc-
tubre de 1999 (Venez.).
135. See Barb. BIT, supra note 115, art. (3)(1).
136. See id. art. (3)(3).
PAST & PRESENT LEGAL GUARANTEES
The BIT with Barbados, for example, provides that national treatment
applies to the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and disposal of
an investment.137
Most-favored-nation (MiFN) treatment guarantees that foreign inves-
tors of a given country are not discriminated against and that they are
granted the same protections vis-A-vis investors of third countries.138
Thus, as per MFN treatment, Venezuela is bound to grant treatment not
less favorable than that granted to investors of third countries. In some
cases, there are reservations or exceptions regarding the standards of
treatment granted to third country nationals under integration treaties,
free trade agreements or double taxation treaties.
The BIT with Germany contains a provision whereby if current or fu-
ture local laws of either contracting party or obligations of international
law result in general or special rules that provide for better treatment to
foreign investments than in the BIT, then the more favorable rules shall
supersede the provisions of the BIT.'39 The BIT with Barbados has a
similar provision. 14 0
In addition to including provisions for national treatment and MFN,
the BIT with Germany provides that no party shall obstruct the manage-
ment, use and enjoyment of an investment of an investor of the other
party by arbitrary or discriminatory measures. 141 The BIT with Vietnam
contains a similar provision. 142
2. National Law
The Venezuelan Constitution guarantees that foreign investors receive
the same conditions that national investors enjoy.143 The Constitution, in
Article 301 guarantees that foreign investors are subject to the same con-
ditions as domestic investors, but "business enterprises, organs or persons
of foreign nationality shall not be granted with regimes more advanta-
geous than those established for Venezuelan nationals."' 44 This protec-
tion only covers sectors where the Venezuelan State has not expressed
any reservation. 145
The Law on the Promotion and Protection of Investments states that
international investments and investors shall have the same rights and
obligations as national investors and investments in like circumstances,
except as provided in special laws and the LPPI itself.14 6
137. See id. art. 2(2).
138. See id. art. 3(2).
139. See Ger. BIT, supra note 119, art. 7.
140. See Barb. BIT, supra note 115, art. 11.
141. See Ger. BIT, supra note 119, art. 2(3).
142. See Viet. BIT, supra 133, art., 2(2).
143. CBRV, supra note 29, art. 301.
144. Id.
145. Id. art. 302.
146. Decreto con Rango y Fuerza de ley de Promocion y Proteccion de Inversiones
[Decree with Rank and Force of Law on Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments], supra note 47, art. 7.
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There is a provision in the LPPI for MFN treatment, 1 4 7 as well as a
provision for non-discrimination of investors or investments by reason of
the country of origin of their capital.14 8
D. FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT AND FULL PROTECTION
AND SECURITY
1. BITs
Venezuela's BITs typically include a guarantee of fair and equitable
treatment. This standard protects against an unjust or arbitrary manner
of treatment that rises to a level unacceptable from an international per-
spective. In determining whether treatment is fair and equitable, the in-
quiry may focus on reasonable legitimate expectations of the investor
created by State conduct.
Fair and equitable treatment implicitly encompasses a guarantee of full
protection and security to investors, although some Venezuelan BITs
contain an express provision on full protection and security in addition to
the one on fair and equitable treatment.14 9 Where a reference to protec-
tion and security is not qualified, as it is not in some Venezuela BITs, it
has been assumed by some arbitral tribunals to be related to protection
and security against violence or crime. But, the BIT with Germany ex-
pands such protection in that it expressly provides that the reference to
protection and security is to legal protection and security. 50
a. National law
Under the LPPI, international investments are entitled to fair and equi-
table treatment in accordance with the rules and criteria of international
law and may not be subject to arbitrary or discriminatory measures hin-
dering their continuation, management, use, enjoyment, expansion, sale
or liquidation.1'5
E. FREE TRANSFER OF CAPITAL
1. BITs
Under the BITs that Venezuela is party to, the contracting parties may
not restrict the free transfer of the payments made to an investor related
147. Id. art. 9.
148. Id. art. 8.
149. See Ger. BIT, supra note 119, art. 2(1); Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Republica
Bolivariana de Venezuela y la Repdblica de Venezuela para la Promoci6n y Pro-
tecci6n Reciproca de Inversiones [Law Approving Agreement on the Promotion
and Protection of Investment between the Government of the Republic of Vene-
zuela and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran], Venez.-Iran, art. 4(1),
Feb. 3, 2006, [hereinafter Iran BIT], http://www.conapri.org/download/Vzla-
Iran.pdf.
150. See Ger. BIT, supra note 119, art. 4(1).
151. Decreto Con Rango y Fuerza de ley de Promocion y Proteccion de Inversiones
[Decree with Rank and Force of Law on Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments], supra note 47, art. 6.
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to an investment, among others: capital remittances, profits, loan repay-
ments, proceeds of sales, and compensations by the Government.152
The BIT with Peru, for example, provides all of these categories on a
non-exclusive basis. It further states that the transfer will be made in a
freely convertible currency, without restriction or delay.' 53
For the free transfer of capital, three aspects are considered: (1) the
type of currency through which the transfer will be achieved, currency of
free convertibility or "any other mechanism" for transferring capitals, (2)
the lapse of time required to conduct the transaction "without delays,"
and (3) the exchange rate to do the transaction, using the rate on the day
of the transaction.154
But, there could be restrictions to capital remittance abroad in case of
balance of payments crisis. For example, the BIT with Costa Rica pro-
vides that each contracting party has the right, under circumstances of
exceptional difficulty or grave difficulties of balance of payments, to tem-
porarily limit the transfers in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. 55
a. National Law
The Law on the Promotion and Protection of Investments contains
protections for the transfer of all payments related to investments. 156
Under its Article 12, provided that internal laws have been complied with
and that taxes have been paid, transfers shall take place without delay, in
convertible currency and at the exchange rate in force on the day of the
transfer.'57 There is a possibility of imposing a time limit on the transfers,
on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis, in accordance with the in-
ternational accepted criteria, due to an extraordinary situation of eco-
nomic or financial nature that might gravely disturb the balance of
payments or the international monetary reserves of the country.158
Since 2003, there has been a system of exchange control whereby all
sales and purchases of currencies are centralized by the Venezuelan Cen-
152. Convenio Entre el Gobierno de la Republica del Peru y el Gobierno de la Repub-
lica de Venezuela Sobre Promocion y Proteccion de Enversiones [Agreement Be-
tween the Government of the Republic of Peru and the Government of the
Republic of Venezuela on Investment Promotion and Protection], Venez.-Peru,
art. 4, Jan. 12, 1996, [hereinafter Peru BIT], http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/
docs/bits/peru-venezuela-esp.pdf.
153. See id.
154. See id. art. 5.
155. Acuerdo entre la Repdblica de Costa Rica y la Repdblica de Venezuela para la
promoci6n y protecci6n reciproca de inversiones [Agreement between the Repub-
lic of Costa Rica and the Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments], Venez.-Costa Rica, art. 8(4), Mar. 17, 1997, Organiza-
tion of American States, [hereinafter Costa Rica BIT], http://www.sice.oas.org/
BITS/cosven-s.asp.
156. Decreto Con Rango y Fuerza de ley de Promocion y Proteccion de Inversiones
[Decree with Rank and Force of Law on Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments], supra note 47, art. 1.
157. Id. art. 12.
158. Id.
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tral Bank.159 The system is managed by a Commission on Administration
of Currency (CADIVI).1 60
Currency needed for capital remittance, maintenance, enhancement,
development and concluding a foreign investment, profits, rents, interest
or dividends transfer, compensation for expropriation, sales price or par-
tial or total liquidation of an investment, payments out of settlements,
payments out of royalties from trademark use, patent, licenses or
franchises as well as those for contracts of technology importation and
technical assistance, and capital reduction must be registered by the in-
vestor authorized by CADIVI.161
F. EXPROPRIATION
1. BITs
As reflected in its BITs, Venezuela has also adopted international stan-
dards for expropriation and measures equivalent to expropriation and
compensation, under the following conditions: the expropriation needs to
be for reasons of public use (social or national interest), on a non-discrim-
inatory basis, under the principles of rule of law and due process of law,
and provided there is prompt, adequate and effective compensation at
fair market value determined before the measure is of public knowledge
and with interest at a market rate.162
All Venezuela's BITs provide that the above conditions also apply to
measures equivalent to expropriation. For example, the BIT with the
Kingdom of Denmark provides that
[i]nvestments of investors of either Contracting Party shall not be
nationalized, expropriated or subjected to measures having effect
equivalent to nationalization or expropriation . . . in the territory of
the other Contracting Party except for a public purpose related to
the needs of the expropriating Party, on the basis of non-discrimina-
tion and against prompt, adequate and effective compensation.1 6 3
The same BIT provides for treatment in regards to restitution, indem-
nification, compensation or other settlement for losses in case of war,
armed conflict or state of national emergency. 164
The BIT with Germany contains a similar provision.165 It provides that
the legality of the expropriation, nationalization or measure equivalent to
159. Currency Exchange Agreement No. 1, Official Gazette No. 37.625, Feb. 5, 2003,
http://www.conapri.org/English/ArticlePlain.asp?articleid=232863.
160. Id.
161. CADIVI Internal Regulation No. 56. http://www.cadivi.gob.ve/images/stories/pdfs/
InversionesExtranjerasfTodos-losTramites/Providencia/Providencia%2ONro%2
0056.pdf
162. Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Venezuela Concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal
Protection of Investments, Venez.-Den., art. 5, Nov. 28, 1994, http://www.unctad.
org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/denmark venezuela.pdf.
163. Id.
164. Id. art. 6.
165. See Ger. BIT, supra 119, art. 4(4).
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expropriation and the amount of the compensation, shall be reviewable in
a procedure before the competent tribunals. 166
The BIT with Canada follows the same format, as it provides that the
investor affected by an expropriation or measure equivalent to expropria-
tion shall have the right to prompt review by a judicial or other indepen-
dent authority of the expropriating State.' 67 The right to review extends
to the investor's case and valuation of its investment or returns.168
Compensation for expropriation is covered by some BITs. The BIT
with Russia, for example, provides that compensation shall be based on
the fair market value of the expropriated investment as calculated imme-
diately prior to the date of the expropriation.16 9 Any delay in paying out
compensation accrues interest at a rate not lower than six month
LIBOR.170
a. National Law
Under the Law on Promotion and Protection of Investments, the stan-
dards on expropriation are similar to those provided for in BITs. The law
provides:
[e]xpropriations of investments, or application thereto of other mea-
sures whose effects are equivalent to an expropriation shall only be
carried out for reasons of public benefit or social interest, following
the procedure legally established for those purposes, in a manner
that is non-discriminatory and with prompt, fair and adequate com-
pensation. The compensation is to be equivalent to the fair price of
the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation
has been announced through the legal mechanisms or made public,
whichever is first. The compensation, which is to include interest up
to the date when payment is actually made, calculated based on stan-
dard commercial criteria, is to be paid without delay. 171
The Law of Expropriation for Reasons of Public Use or Social Interest
provides the relevant mechanisms and procedures as well as the compe-
tent tribunals to undertake an expropriation in Venezuela. 172
The Law for the Defense of the Persons for Access to Goods and Ser-
vices also provides for expropriation.17 3 It allows the Government to ex-
propriate any asset as a punishment for not complying with its
166. Id. art. 4(2).
167. See Can. BIT, supra note 117, art. VII(2).
168. Id.
169. See Russ. BIT, supra note 132, art. 5(2).
170. Id.
171. Decreto con Rango y Fuerza de ley de Promocion y Proteccion de Inversiones
[Decree with Rank and Force of Law on Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments], supra note 47, art. 11.
172. Official Gazette No. 37.475, Jul. 1, 2002, http://docs.venezuela.justia.com/federales/
leyes/ley-de-expropiacion-por-causa-de-utilidad-publica-o-social.pdf.
173. Ley Para la Defensa de las Personas en el Acceso para los Bienes y Servicios [Law
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provisions.17 4 Under certain circumstances, the assets can be expropri-
ated without the legislative branch (Asamblea Nacional) previously de-
claring that the expropriation is undertaken for reasons of public use.
Those circumstances include: (i) having two prices for goods sold at retail
upon which there is a price control; 75 (ii) increasing the price of goods
upon which there is already a public price;176 (iii) speculation; 77 (iv)
purchases undertaken with purposes of speculation; 78 (v) goods being
kept from the public for purposes of speculation; 179 (vi) boycott;180 (vii)
selling goods or food perished or in bad conditions.18 Likewise, the as-
sets that can be expropriated under the terms of this law can be occupied
ab initio.182 The compensation for expropriation in these cases shall be
the remainder after the subtraction of the fines, sanctions or damages,
and other considerations.
G. CONTRACTS AND OBLIGATIONS OBSERVANCE
1. BITs
Umbrella Clauses are not very common in Venezuela's BITs. Where
used, the wording is usually broad. In the BIT between Venezuela and
Iran, it provides:
"Each Contracting Party guarantees compliance of the commitments
made in connection with the investments object of this Agreement."' 83
The BIT with Germany also provides that "each party shall comply
with any other obligation it has entered into related to the treatment of
the investments of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party
in its territory."1 84
According to the BIT with Switzerland, each of the contracting parties
will conform to obligations taken by it in connection with the treatment
of the investments made in its territory. 18
The BIT with Spain contains a similar provision on the duty of the




175. Id. art. 46.
176. Id. art. 47.
177. Id. art. 65.
178. Id. art. 66.
179. Id. art. 67.
180. Id. art. 68.
181. Id. art. 69.
182. Id. art. 6.
183. Iran BIT, supra note 149, art. 10.
184. Ger. BIT, supra note 119, art. 7(2).
185. Accord entre la Conf6d6ration Suisse et la R6publique du Venezuela Concernant
la Promotion et la Protection R6ciproque des Investissements [Agreement be-
tween Switzerland and the Republic of Venezuela for the Promotion and Recipro-
cal Protection of Investments], Venez.-Switz., art. 11(2), Nov. 18, 1993,
Organization of American States, http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSby
Country/BITs/VENSwitzerland f.pdf.
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spect to the treatment of investments of investors of the Other Con-
tracting Party. 186
a. National Law
Under the Civil Code, contracts have the status of law between the
parties.187 The Code also provides that the contracts shall be enforced in
good faith and any remedies arising from them shall be based on equity,
custom, and the law.188
H. PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
1. BITs
Performance requirements are not usually dealt with in the BITs
signed by Venezuela. But, in some of the agreements, references are
made to prohibitions on the Contracting States from requiring individuals
of any particular nationality to be appointed to senior management posi-
tions. That is the case in the BIT with Canada, which provides such a
prohibition,189 but the BIT also states that a Contracting Party may re-
quire a majority of the board of directors, or any committee thereof, of an
enterprise that is an investment under the BIT be of a particular national-
ity or residence, provided it does not affect control of the investment by
the investor.190 It also contains a provision regarding the temporary en-
try of aliens for managerial, executive or specialized positions.191
Most BITs provide for subrogation of the interests, rights or titles of
investors on behalf of the other Contracting State or an agency thereof in
case of payments by that State or agency under a non-commercial risk
guarantee or insurance program.
Some BITs explicitly provide that a Contracting State cannot present a
valid defense in an investment arbitration by arguing that the investor has




Most BITs provide for dispute resolution mechanisms for disputes be-
tween States and disputes between States and investors. In most cases
186. See Spain BIT, supra note 124, art. 3(4).
187. See C6digo de Prodecimiento Civil [Cod. Proc. Civ.] art. 1159 (Venez.).
188. Id. art. 1160.
189. See Can. BIT, supra note 117, art. V(1)(a).
190. Id. art. V(1)(b).
191. Id. art. V(2).
192. Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repdblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Repdblica de Chile sobre promoci6n y protecci6n recfproca de inversions [Agree-
ment between the Government of the Republic of Venezuela and the Government
of the Republic of Chile on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments],
Venez.-Chile, art. 8(5), Apr. 2, 1993, Organization of American States, [hereinafter
Chile BIT], http://www.sice.oas.org/BITS/VNCHTOCS.ASP.
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the disputes between States are to be resolved through diplomatic chan-
nels and arbitral tribunals if that fails.
For disputes between States and investors, the BITs provide initially
for an amicable solution in a reasonable period. If that fails, the investor
is usually entitled to elect the forum under which the dispute shall be
settled which could be the local courts or an arbitral tribunal. In the last
case, it could be under ICSID. But, not all BITs provide for ICSID arbi-
tration. Some provide for ad hoc arbitration under the UNCITRAL
rules, or any other institutional arbitration, such as the ICC, LCIA or
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce or any other complementary mecha-
nism provided by the BIT. In the recent BIT with the Government of the
Federation of Russia, both countries consented that disputes with inves-
tors could be submitted, at the choice of the investor, to local courts of
the contracting countries, an ad hoc tribunal established in accordance
with the UNCITRAL rules or the arbitration institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce.193
In some cases, multiple fora are provided alternatively or in supple-
mentary fashion, that is, if it is impossible to request arbitration in one
forum, the next one provided in the BIT becomes available. But some
BITs provide for a "fork in the road" provision; that is that once a dispute
settlement mechanism is chosen the other one is no longer available. For
example, the BIT with Argentina provides for the possibility of settling
disputes with the host country in local courts or through international
arbitration.194 The BIT provides that once the investor has chosen a dis-
pute settlement mechanism, the choice is final.195 The BITs with Chile,
Ecuador, Costa Rica, Peru, Vietnam, Iran, and Cuba follow a similar pat-
tern on the choice of the dispute resolution mechanism, as does the BIT
with Bolivia. But, the BIT with Bolivia provides that a dispute submitted
to local courts cannot be submitted to arbitration unless there has been a
denial of justice in accordance with international law.196
The BIT with Canada approaches the "fork in the road" provision from
a different perspective. It establishes as a condition for the investor to
submit the dispute to arbitration that it had waived its right to initiate or
193. See Russ. BIT, supra note 132, art. 9(2).
194. Acuerdo entre el Gobierno de la Repdblica de Venezuela y el Gobierno de la
Repdblica de Argentina para la promoci6n y protecci6n reciproca de las inversions
[Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Venezuela and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protec-
tion of Investments], Venez.-Arg., art. 11(2), Nov. 16, 1993, Organization of
American States, [hereinafter Argentina BIT], http://www.sice.oas.org/BITS/
Argvens.asp.
195. Id.
196. Negociaciones entre el Gobierno de la Repdblica de Bolivia y el Gobierno de la
Reptiblica Bolivariana de Venezuela para un acuerdo sobre promoci6n y protec-
ci6n reciproca de inversiones [Negotiations between the Government of the Re-
public of Bolivia and the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for
an Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments], Venez.-
Bol., art. 9, Mar. 31, 2000, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/bolivia-venezuela-sp.pdf.
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continue any other proceedings in relation to the measure alleged to be in
breach of the BIT, before local courts or in any other dispute settlement
procedure.19 7
In some BITs, the consent to arbitrate in the case of disputes between
investors and States is explicit. BITs with Denmark, Barbados, Chile, Ca-
nada, Cuba, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Vietnam and Switzerland
illustrate this point.
For example, the BIT with Canada provides: "[e]ach Contracting Party
hereby gives its unconditional consent to the submission of a dispute to
international arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this Arti-
cle."s98 Similar language is used in the BIT with Barbados, 199 while the
BIT with the United Kingdom uses the following language:
Disputes between a national or company of one Contracting Party
and the other Contracting Party concerning an obligation of the lat-
ter under this Agreement in relation to an investment of the former
which have not been amicably settled shall, after a period of three
months from written notification of a claim, be submitted to interna-
tional arbitration if the national or company concerned so wishes. 200
Other BITs do not contain such an explicit reference to consent. In
some cases, moreover, the wording requiring arbitration is imperative. In
others, the State makes an offer to arbitrate which is to be accepted by
the claimant by choosing from various choices of fora to initiate arbitra-
tion. Furthermore, within the wording of the LPPI, consent is condi-
tioned on the relevant treaty.
The BIT with Argentina uses less imperative wording, providing that
the investor and the Contracting State could agree to submit the dispute
to certain arbitral tribunals. 201
Most BITs limit the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals to specific matters
within the scope of the agreement. For example, the BIT with Costa Rica
provides that the arbitral award will be limited to whether there has been
a violation of the treaty, the damage caused to the investor, and the
amount of the compensation. 202 Similar provisions are contained in the
BITs with Germany and Switzerland, among others, but not in the BITs
with Russia, Iran, Vietnam and Canada.
Although statutes of limitation are not usual in BITs, the one with Ca-
nada requires the submission of the dispute to arbitration no more than
three years after the date on which the investor first acquired or should
acquire knowledge of the alleged breach of the BIT and knowledge of the
loss or damage. 203
197. See Can. BIT, supra note 117, art. XII(3)(b).
198. Id. art. XII(5).
199. See Barb. BIT, supra note 115, art. 8(4).
200. See U.K. BIT, supra note 125, art. 8(1).
201. Argentina BIT, supra note 194, art. 11(3).
202. Costa Rica BIT, supra note 155, art. 11(5).
203. Can. BIT, supra note 117, art. XII(3)(d).
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Provisions against the use of diplomatic protection are explicitly pro-
vided for in some Venezuelan BITs. The BIT with Argentina provides
that each contracting party is committed not to use diplomatic protection
in connection with the disputes covered by the BIT unless the other con-
tracting party refuses to comply with the arbitral award. 204 The BITs
with Chile205 and Costa Rica 206 contain similar provisions.
a. National Law
The Law on the Promotion and Protection of Investments refers to ar-
bitration of disputes under which there is a controversy between the State
and the investor in two cases. 207 The first case is when there is no BIT
between Venezuela and the country of the investor. In this case, the dis-
pute shall be settled in local courts, that is, the courts with jurisdiction on
administrative matters to be determined as per the amount of the dispute
or in local arbitral tribunals at the election of the investor.208 In the sec-
ond case, the provisions of the Law on Commercial Arbitration shall ap-
ply. When there is a BIT between Venezuela and the country of the
investor, international arbitration shall become available if the relevant
BIT provides for it, notwithstanding the possibility of using the litigation
mechanisms provided by Venezuelan law.209
V. SIGNIFICANT INVESTMENT AWARDS ON VENEZUELA
In 1997, an ICSID arbitral tribunal issued the first decision involving a
Latin American country. In Fedax N. V. v. Venezuela, the decision on
jurisdiction of the tribunal in a dispute based on the Netherlands-Vene-
zuela BIT dealt inter alia with the issue of whether indirect investments,
such as the acquisition of negotiable instruments, were entitled to inter-
national protection under the ICSID Convention.210 The tribunal con-
cluded that: "[i]t is apparent that the term 'directly' relates in this Article
to the 'dispute' and not to the 'investment'. It follows that jurisdiction
can exist even in respect of investments that are not direct, so long as the
dispute arises directly from such transaction .... ."211 The criteria of the
Fedax tribunal has been cited in numerous investment arbitrations ever
since.
In 2001, in the Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A.
(AUCOVEN) v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the tribunal was
204. Argentina BIT, supra note 194, art. 11(7).
205. Chile BIT, supra note 192, art. 8(6).
206. Costa Rica BIT, supra note 155, art. 11(7).
207. Decreto con Rango y Fuerza de ley de Promocion y Proteccion de Inversiones
[Decree with Rank and Force of Law on Promotion and Protection of Invest-
ments], supra note 47, arts. 21-23.
208. Id. art. 23.
209. Id. art. 22.
210. Fedax N.V. v. Venez., ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3, Objections to Jurisdiction, 1 24
(July 11, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 1378 (1998).
211. .Id.
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asked to address the issue of foreign control of a company with the na-
tionality of the host State. 2 12 The tribunal emphasized the role of the
consent of the parties.
The parties had agreed in a concession contract to ICSID jurisdiction
subject to the condition that the majority of the shares in AUCOVEN
were transferred to a national of another Contracting State.2 1 3 Upon that
happening, the parties agreed that AUCOVEN would be considered a
company under foreign control and consequently a national of another
Contracting State.214 The tribunal found that the parties chose to define
the term "foreign control" taking into consideration only the transfer of
shares of AUCOVEN. 215
The tribunal also stressed that it usually accepts that economic criteria
reflect reality better than legal criteria. 216 But, the tribunal differed from
the SOABI and AMCO cases where the tribunals used the economic cri-
teria to make interpretations to determine the foreign control, although
they reached different levels of control.217
On determining the nationality of the company that acquired the ma-
jority of the shares of AUCOVEN, the tribunal used the most common
criterion, i.e., place of incorporation. 218 It concluded that it had jurisdic-
tion because AUCOVEN, a company incorporated in Venezuela, was
under the control of an American company, and according to the parties'
consent, that was sufficient to consider the investor a national of another
Contracting State.219
A. DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES
Venezuela has signed agreements with various countries to avoid
double taxation. These agreements limit the taxes which may apply to
dividends, interest and royalties obtained by the foreign investor from
any of the countries signatories of the double taxation treaties.
Thus, if an investor is active in several countries, the investor would be
subject to tax in each of the countries only for the activities undertaken
therein. To date, Venezuela has followed the OECD model on double
taxation treaties and has entered into agreements with the following
countries: Germany, China, Spain, Mexico, Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Barbados, Colombia, Czech Republic, Norway, the United States,
Belgium, France, Peru, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Portugal, Bolivia,
Indonesia, Canada, Ecuador, Italy, United Kingdom, and Trinidad and
Tobago.
212. Autopista Concesionada de Venez., C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez., ICSID
Case No. ARB/00/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 81 (Sept. 27, 2001), 6 ICSID Rep.
419 (2004).
213. Id. 89.
214. Id. 9 83.
215. Id. 1 86.
216. Id. 1119.
217. Id.
218. Id. 9 134.
219. Id.
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